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Abstract
The pharmaceutical industry has always used sales representatives to target physicians (de-
tailing), who are a key link in sales and market share for prescription pharmaceuticals. Since
August of 1997 when the Food and Drug Administration eased the restrictions on Direct-to-
consumer advertising (DTCA), there has been a dramatic increase in the use of DTCA by
pharmaceutical firms to target end customers (patients). DTCA seems to have two diﬀerent
eﬀects on pharmaceutical markets. The first is to inform patients about the availability of
drugs for some ailments, thus expanding the market (constructive). The second is to per-
suade patients to talk about specific brands when they meet physicians, with the objective
of influencing market share (combative). We consider both eﬀects of DTCA in the pres-
ence of a detailing program in a competitive environment. We incorporate the dynamics of
physician-patient interaction in a game-theoretic model where firms decide on the form of
DTCA to adopt (constructive or combative) and then compete in the marketplace by choos-
ing detailing and DTCA levels. We answer four questions: What is the impact of adopting
DTCA on competitive intensity? How do optimal detailing levels for a firm change with the
adoption of DTCA? How should the DTCA strategy for a firm vary depending on whether it
is stronger or weaker in its degree of influence in the physician’s oﬃce? Finally, under what
conditions would competing firms voluntarily decide to pursue constructive DTCA?
(Key Words: Pharmaceutical Marketing, Detailing, Game Theory)
1 Introduction
The pharmaceutical market is characterized by very large promotional expenditures. Tradi-
tionally, these promotions have been aimed at physicians who are responsible for prescribing
medications to patients. Besides detailing by sales reps to inform physicians, firms have also
used advertising in medical journals to reach physicians and are now using eDetailing (elec-
tronic detailing), a variant of traditional detailing. In addition to promoting the product
to physicians, firms have also promoted their brands directly to patients1. A change in the
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulation in August of 1997 has lead to a major
shift in this direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs. Prior to this reg-
ulatory change, any DTC promotion that contained brand name and medical claims had to
provide a “brief summary” of drug eﬀectiveness, its side eﬀects, and any contraindications.
Consequently, advertising on television was very expensive. As a result of this change in reg-
ulation, firms can now advertise the brand and medical claims without this summary. Firms
only need to include a “major statement” of the most important risks and refer patients to
other sources for more comprehensive information (Iizuka and Jin, 2005). This has made
TV advertising relatively aﬀordable and cost eﬀective. As a result of this change, DTCA in
the US pharmaceutical industry has increased from $800 million in 1996 to more than $ 4.2
billion in 2005.2
As firms spend huge amounts of money on DTCA, managers wonder what exactly does
1Henceforth, we will use the term "patient" instead of "consumer" or "customer". It is implied in this
context that the patient is the eventual consumer of the product.
2November 2006 Report by US Government Accountability Oﬃce.
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DTCAdo (Rosenthal, et al. 2003, Iizuka 2005)? It has been suggested that DTCA can help in
expanding the market, in gaining market share, and in improving drug compliance by patients
(Wosinska, 2005). Empirical evidence suggests that DTCA has a significant impact on the
category or product class sales (Wosinska 2003, Narayanan, Desiraju and Chintagunta 2004,
Iizuka and Jin 2005). At the same time, much of pharmaceutical advertising is at the brand
level and patients’ requests for specific drug brands may influence physicians’ prescribing
decisions. Studies suggest that patient requests have a substantial impact on physician
behavior (Herzenstein et al., 2004). A recent FDA study by Aikin et al(2004) showed that
59% of physicians prescribe in the product class that their patients ask for and 46% prescribe
the brand that the patients ask for. However, Iizuka and Jin (2006) show that in the non-
sedating antihistamines category, DTCA has no impact on product choice. In addition,
though there is positive interaction between DTCA and detailing, this eﬀect is very small.3
4 Overall, it seems that DTCA has both market expanding and share increasing eﬀects
with significant ambiguity about the relative strengths of these eﬀects. It is important to
recognize that market expansion occurs due to constructive advertising while share increase
occurs due to combative advertising. In the pharmaceutical industry context, constructive
advertising provides information about the disease itself including information on symptoms,
possible remedies and side eﬀects with much less emphasis on the brand being advertised. In
combative advertising, the basic assumption is that the patients know about the particular
disease and the currently available drugs, and hence advertising emphasizes the advantages
3The DTCA and detailing interaction eﬀect in Iizuka and Jin (2006) is statistically insignificant.
4For a more comprehensive review of the empirical literature in this area, we refer the readers to Man-
chanda et al. (2005).
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of the brand being advertised relative to other competing brands. For example, the early
advertisements for Viagra were targeted at informing the patient about the existence of an
oral pill for erectile dysfunction (constructive), while the later advertisements by competitors
such as Cialis emphasized the “36 hour” nature of the pill which was unique compared to
other competing drugs in the market (combative). While recognizing the two eﬀects of
advertising is an important task, a greater managerial concern is the problem of resource
allocation across detailing and DTCA for a pharmaceutical firm operating in a competitive
market. Several questions regarding firm strategies arise in this setting. We list them below:
• The use of DTCAmight definitely provide some benefit to a firm in a monopoly setting.
However, as with many productive investments, it is less clear that DTCA will benefit
firms in a competitive setting. In particular, under what conditions would competing
firms get locked in a prisoner’s dilemma when given the option to oﬀer DTCA?
• A related issue is faced by consulting firms (e.g., Health Products Research & ZS Asso-
ciates) who advise pharmaceutical firms on issues regarding pharmaceutical promotion.
These consulting firms reveal that managers in pharmaceutical firms are concerned
about the impact of increasing DTCA on the overall promotional spend. Initially, the
managers may believe that they can take money out of detailing and move the same to
DTCA and experience a net profit gain in the process without increasing the promo-
tional spend. However, analysis of promotional sensitivity data by the consulting firms
has revealed that introduction of DTCA may increase the return-on-investment (ROI)
of detailing because of synergies. Hence detailing levels should be increased to utilize
this phenomenon optimally. This in turn suggests an increase in the promotional ex-
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penditure, contrary to what the managers are expecting. Consequently, the important
question is: what conditions would cause detailing spend to increase / decrease with
the introduction of DTCA?
• Wosinska(2003) claims that given the unequal power of firms in a particular market,
firms with a lower degree of influence in the physician’s oﬃce should not invest in
DTCA since the firm stronger in detailing will capture a larger fraction of the market
growth due to DTCA. However, the real world throws up exceptions to this rule. For
instance, for the past few years, the product with the highest DTCA spend is Lunesta5
(indicated for insomnia) which is manufactured by Sepracor. They have marketed this
drug successfully with a relatively small sales force as compared to Sanofi-Aventis which
produces the major competing product Ambien.6 Does this imply that Sepracor’s
DTCA strategy is incorrect or can we explain this strategy as an equilibrium outcome
of a rational decision in a competitive environment?
• Finally, many questions have been raised regarding the negative impact of DTCA,
particularly combative DTCA, on patient welfare. The solution that is frequently sug-
gested by various interest groups is to legally enforce constructive DTCA on firms.
For example, the American Medical Association currently condones DTCA advertising
on a case-by-case basis and recently adopted a policy that calls for DTCA to empha-
size patient education about individual diseases rather than specific brands (Sheehan,
2003). But it does not seem that such enforcement is always necessary. For example,
AstraZeneca has volunteered to pursue balanced and socially responsible advertising
5http://www.pharmalive.com/magazines/medad/view.cfm?articleID=3522
6Boston Business Journal, January 20, 2006
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("constructive" advertising) for its products7. Under what conditions would competing
firms voluntarily decide to pursue constructive DTCA?
We seek an answer to these questions by considering both constructive and combative eﬀects
of DTCA in the presence of a detailing program in a competitive environment. We incor-
porate the dynamics of physician-patient interaction in a game-theoretic model where firms
decide on the form of DTCA to adopt (constructive or combative) and then compete in the
marketplace by choosing detailing and DTCA levels. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2, we review literature related to the problem under consideration. In
Section 3, we set up the general model. In Section 4, we describe the procedure for analysis
of the equilibrium outcome. Section 5 describes key results when the firms are homogeneous
in terms of their degree of influence in the physician’s oﬃce while Section 6 discusses the
main results for heterogeneous firms. All proofs for the propositions in Sections 5 and 6 are
provided in Appendix A. In Section 7, we conclude and give directions for future research.
2 Related Literature
The literature on constructive / cooperative advertising versus combative advertising has
a long history in marketing. Friedman (1984) posits that advertising can be cooperative
to the extent that it benefits all the firms in the industry and not just the firm that is
advertising. This occurs when advertising increases consumer awareness of a certain product
7http://www.astrazeneca-us.com/content/aboutAZ/healthIssuesPerspectives/astrazeneca-dtc-
advertising.asp
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category without influencing preferences (Marshall 1921; Chen et al 2009). On the other
hand, combative advertising is done by a firm with the intention of increasing its market
share without expanding the pie or the market (Marshall 1921). Grossman and Shapiro
(1984) posit that in markets with diﬀerentiated products there is too much constructive
advertising. Soberman (2004) shows that constructive advertising allows competing firms to
charge either higher or lower prices depending on the level of diﬀerentiation between them.
The eﬀect of combative advertising is modeled in a variety of ways in the literature (Dixit
and Norman 1978, Becker and Murphy 1993, Chen et al 2009). It can increase market
share by increasing the perceived value for the product or by redistributing the weights on
the product attributes in a manner that is beneficial to the firm. Depending on the cost of
advertising, combative advertising can lead to higher or lower levels of price competition.
Bass et al. (2005) focus on the optimal allocation of resources across time between generic
(constructive) and brand (combative) advertising. We adapt the notion of constructive /
combative advertising to the pharmaceutical industry. We focus on optimal allocation of
resources across constructive and combative DTCA in a competitive environment where the
firms use another form of promotion (detailing) to target the primary decision maker (the
physician).
Literature on DTCA in the pharmaceutical market is more recent (e.g., Rosenthal et al.
2003, Narayanan, Desiraju, and Chintagunta 2004, Wosinska 2005). Empirical evidence sug-
gests that DTCA has a significant impact on the category or product class sales(Wosinska
2003, Narayanan, Desiraju and Chintagunta 2004, Iizuka and Jin 2005). However, patient
requests have a substantial impact on physician behavior (Herzenstein et al., 2004). Conse-
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quently, DTCA not only aﬀects product class sales but also positively impacts market share
(Narayanan, Desiraju and Chintagunta, 2004). A positive impact on market share can occur
only when a physician decides to incorporate knowledge about a patient’s exposure to DTCA
into the final prescription decision even though the physician may have enough information
to prescribe a product using detailing information alone. This can happen only when the
physician perceives DTCA to have a positive impact on patient welfare. Patient welfare has
multiple dimensions. The most obvious one is the dimension of clinical fit as evaluated by
the physician during physician-patient interaction. However, the medical and public health
literature documents several other dimensions of patient welfare. DTCA has a positive im-
pact on patient adherence/compliance to prescription medications (Holmer 2002, Wosinska
2005). DTCA may also lead to better patient outcomes through a mediated placebo eﬀect
(Almasi, 2006). We incorporate both category enhancing and share enhancing aspects of
DTCA in our model. Further, we model the interaction between DTCA and detailing in the
physician’s oﬃce where the physician makes a final prescription decision based on a combi-
nation of clinical fit information provided by detailing and DTCA enabled patient preference
information obtained during physician-patient interaction.
Literature is now evolving to analyze the eﬀects of detailing and DTCA on a firm’s profits.
A recent example is Amaldoss and He (2008) who study the eﬀect of DTCA and detailing
on a firm’s profits in a competitive setting using an aggregate demand model. On the other
hand, we study the strategic interaction between detailing and DTCA and its implications
on firm profits through an examination of the dynamics of physician-patient interaction.
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3 The General Model
3.1 Modeling Sales
Given that physicians play a central role in the sale of a prescription drug, it is important
to understand the impact of detailing on sales even without the use of DTCA. We address
this issue first.
Impact of Detailing
Physicians make a decision for a patient based on their perception of clinical fit with respect
to a particular product. We also assume that clinical fit has more to do with medical
evaluation and is independent of any patient preference metrics such as dosage levels and
usage patterns (a patient may be clinically less suited for a particular product as compared
to another and yet the patient may prefer that product simply because it is easy to use).
Denote the detailing levels of the two firms by α1 and α2. Based on a Hotelling line model
of clinical fit, we derive the market share expressions of each firm8. Denote the market share
of firm 1 by S and assume that firm 1 is the stronger firm without loss of generality. Firm
1’s market share is given by:
S =
θ
2
+
µ
α1 − α2
2
¶
(1)
In this specification, θ represents heterogeneity in physician oﬃce influence across the two
firms and we require θ ∈ [1, 2]. When θ hits its upper limit, the weaker firm’s detailing has
no impact on its own market share. We assume that even with zero detailing, the physician
8The exact derivation is available in Appendix B.
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is able to provide a prescription to all patients based on information gathered through her
own eﬀorts. This implies complete market coverage. Thus, the share for product 2 is given
by:
1− S =
µ
1− θ
2
¶
+
µ
α2 − α1
2
¶
(2)
When the firms are homogeneous in terms of their degree of influence in the physician’s
oﬃce, we simply set θ = 1. Note that we have not used price in determining the share
term. In pharmaceutical markets, price setting is a result of many complex factors such
as characteristics of the drug, prevalent health care policy and managed care issues. Price
competition in pharmaceutical markets usually happens when firms want their drugs to
be included in the formulary of various health insurance companies. The latter want the
payments for the insurees’ treatments to be minimized. Consequently, price competition in
the physician’s oﬃce occurs only when at least one of the competing products is a generic.
We restrict attention to competition between two patented products produced by diﬀerent
pharmaceutical firms but used for the same indication. Hence, we assume that the market
share outcome in the physician’s oﬃce is inelastic in price for all further analysis.
Impact of Constructive DTCA
The eﬀect of constructive DTCA is to expand the market. Consider a category that is com-
pletely new (such as erectile dysfunction a few years ago) or a category that is not considered
life threatening enough for most patients to be aware of the latest possible prescription treat-
ments (such as adult attention deficit disorder). In such a case, the purpose of DTCA is to
inform patients about the existence of prescription treatment, thus encouraging them to see a
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physician for advice. We normalize the total number of patients to 1. Of these, some patients
are aware about the existence of prescription treatment for their condition and will consult
a physician on their own irrespective of advertising exposure. We denote these patients by
(1− φ). The remaining patients can potentially approach a physician if they are exposed to
constructive DTCA. These patients are denoted by φ. Let δi be the DTCA level of firm i,
where i = 1 and 2 respectively. Let these DTCA levels lie in the range [0,1]. We assume that
all patients are exposed to advertising from both firms. The higher is the spending by a firm
the greater is its DTCA eﬀectiveness.9 Further, the content of these advertisements influ-
ences whether the eﬀectiveness is constructive or combative. Let ki be the level of combative
content and 1− ki the level of constructive content in the DTCA level δi by firm i. Hence,
the constructive DTCA eﬀectiveness is (1− ki) δi and the combative DTCA eﬀectiveness is
kiδi for firm i. Since constructive advertising from both firms is about the disease rather
than any specific brand, the patient cannot distinguish between such advertising from either
firm (assuming that the patient attaches equal credibility to the information provided by
both firms). Thus, we can add the advertising intensities of both firms to give the overall
constructive advertising intensity which then determines the expected number of patients
who approach the physician. All of φ will be captured only when the constructive DTCA
eﬀectiveness of both firms combined (denoted by the expression (1− k1) · δ1 + (1− k2) · δ2)
reaches one.10 Denote the total eﬀective market size by M . Given a duopoly with firm 1 at
a DTCA level of δ1 and firm 2 at a DTCA level of δ2, the total market for each firm would
9For example, higher spending enables a firm to buy more tv spots. This in turn increases the eﬀectiveness
of DTCA for the firm. We assume that the choices among tv spots are all of equal quality.
10This is merely a benchmark and a change in this assumption does not aﬀect the main results.
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be:
M = (1− φ) + ((1− k1) · δ1 + (1− k2) · δ2) · φ (3)
When solving for the equilibrium, we need to impose the constraint (1−k1)·δ1+(1−k2)·δ2 ≤ 1
in order to ensure that the total eﬀective market size M does not exceed 1.
Impact of Combative DTCA
Combative advertising provides brand-specific information such as eﬃcacy, side eﬀects and
other miscellaneous information such as mode and frequency of consumption. While the
past literature (Narayanan, Desiraju and Chintagunta, 2004) has confirmed the positive
impact of DTCA on market share, the exact mechanism that causes this impact merits at-
tention. An important question to answer is: why would the physician change her decision
to prescribe a drug based on advertising information provided by a firm to the patient?
Does the final decision take into account prior detailing information provided? Physicians
are concerned about maximizing patient welfare. Patient welfare has multiple dimensions.
The most obvious one is the dimension of clinical fit as evaluated by the physician during
physician-patient interaction. However, the medical and public health literature documents
several other dimensions of patient welfare. Lack of adherence / compliance to prescribed
medication results in a large number of premature deaths and increased hospitalization rates
(Loden & Schooler 2000, Sullivan, Kreling & Hazlet 1990). Noncompliance occurs even in the
face of severe potential consequences (Cramer 2001). Thus, increasing adherence/compliance
to prescribed regimens is an important objective of the physician as well. Physicians believe
that patient exposure to DTCA advertising increases their comfort level and improves ad-
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herence/compliance (Aikin et al 2004, Holmer 2002, Wosinska 2005). Thus, DTCA can alter
the physician’s prescription decision if the physician believes that the adherence/compliance
benefits outweigh the clinical cost incurred by switching the drug. A similar eﬀect can occur
if DTCA improves the placebo eﬀect in patients (Almasi, 2006). The placebo eﬀect is an
apparent improvement in health that is not due to any treatment but rather due to the pa-
tient’s belief that she will improve. This eﬀect is well documented in the medical literature
(Beecher, 1955). Borsook & Becerra (2005) provide a extensive review of medical literature
in this area. Shiv et al (2005) show that marketing actions can mediate the placebo eﬀect
even in a non-medical context. Thus, DTCA can again alter the physician’s prescription
decision if the placebo benefits outweigh the clinical fit costs.
However, the extent of non-clinical patient benefits may vary depending on patient prefer-
ences. Pharmaceutical products may have attributes that are not the same as those that
physicians look for in terms of clinical fit. These attributes relate to product characteristics
that are directly relevant to patients such as dosage levels, mode of use (pill or injection,
chewable or non-chewable), eﬀectiveness patterns (drowsy or non-drowsy, cholesterol reduc-
tion through diet absorption or genetic sources) and firm image. We divide the patient
population based on the strength of their preferences for certain product attributes. Some
patients do not have strong preferences about the attributes of the product they use. Such
patients simply want to make a well-informed decision during a physician visit. Conse-
quently, when they meet with a physician, they talk about all brands that they have been
exposed to through advertising. Further, the nature of the conversation reveals to the physi-
cian that the patient does not have strong preferences regarding a particular product. We
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label these patients as “weak preference” patients and there are a λ proportion of them in
the market. Since all patients are exposed to advertising from both firms, each “weak pref-
erence” patient talks to the physician about both products. The amount of time and eﬀort
spent by a patient on a particular brand increases with the advertising intensity level kiδi of
that brand. Thus, if both firms oﬀer combative advertising of equal intensity, then the “weak
preference” patient spends an equal amount of time on both brands during the physician-
patient interaction. Finally, the physician has to make a prescription decision based on the
patient’s conversation and her own knowledge based on detailing. Since the nature of the
conversation reveals to the physician that the patient does not have a strong preference for
any product, any information provided by the patient complements the information available
with the physician and this then impacts the physician’s decision. Specifically, in the context
of the Hotelling model of patient fit discussed earlier, the location of the marginal patient
(indiﬀerent between product 1 and 2) shifts from S to S0. The extent of the shift depends on
relative combative DTCA levels. Here S0 gets a prescription for product 1 while 1− S0 gets
a prescription for product 2. The ratio S0 is a result of the combined information provided
by detailing and DTCA such that a particular firm’s detailing and DTCA positively impact
each other. Consequently, the ratio S0 is given by:
S0 = S +4S1 −4S2
where 4S1 is the increase in share due to combative DTCA of firm 1 while 4S2 is the
increase in share of firm 2 due to its own combative DTCA (manifests as a decrease in
share of firm 1 due to complete market coverage). The expressions for 4S1 and 4S2 must
exhibit the following properties in order to describe a synergistic or complementary relation-
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ship between detailing and combative advertising: it should be increasing in S and 1 − S
respectively (greater the baseline share due to detailing, greater is the impact of combative
advertising); it should be increasing in k1δ1 and k2δ2 respectively (greater a firm’s combative
advertising intensity, greater is the positive share impact); there should be positive interac-
tion between both baseline share due to own detailing and own advertising level. A suitable
set of expressions for 4S1 and 4S2 are:
4S1 = 1
2
· k1δ1 · S (4)
4S2 = 1
2
· k2δ2 · (1− S) (5)
Other patients have strong preferences about the attributes of the product they want to
use. They form a 1− λ proportion of the total market. Such patients initiate a discussion
with a physician only if they have been suﬃciently exposed to the product for which they
have a strong preference such that they are convinced about this preference. They talk with
the physician exclusively about that product. The nature of the conversation reveals to the
physician that the patient has a strong preference for a particular product. We label such
patients as “strong preference” patients. Conviction about a product can arise only when the
patient understands the major attributes of the product and concludes that these attributes
fit her preferences. To incorporate this aspect into the analysis, suppose that the "strong
preference" customer population (1− λ)M is divided into two equal segments such that
each segment has a fundamental preference for one product over the other11. An individual
11Assuming that these two segments are not equal in size or that they do not include all strong preference
patients (1− λ)M does not aﬀect the main insights. For instance, some patients may prefer a benchmark
drug oﬀered by a firm that is not a strategic player in our analysis.
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patient typically does not have knowledge about this split of the patient population. Within
each segment, customers vary in their cognitive capacity to understand product attributes
eﬀectively through advertising (Anand & Sternthal 1989, Kohle & Kim 2006). Term the
cognitive barrier to understanding product attributes as x. Greater advertising intensity
overcomes this barrier and helps patients understand the attributes of a product. Assume
that x is distributed uniformly from 0 to 1. A patient of type x understands the attributes
of product i if kiδi − x ≥ 0. This allows us to derive the number of patients who speak
with the physician about products 1 and 2
¡k1δ1
2
and k2δ2
2
respectively
¢
12. Since the nature
of the "strong preference" patient’s conversation reveals to the physician that the patient has
a strong preference for a particular product, the physician prescribes the patient-preferred
brand.13 Thus, in the context of the Hotelling model of patient fit, rather than shifting
the location of the marginal patient, a fraction of the patients whom the physician was to
prescribe a particular product get the opposite drug because of the revelation of these strong
preferences. The flow of patients is split as follows. A "strong preference" patient population
(1− λ)M arrives. Without a conversation about a particular brand, the physician splits
the flow into product 1 prescriptions S · (1− λ)M and product 2 prescriptions (1− S) ·
(1− λ)M. Cross-flow occurs if the physician-patient conversation reveals a conflict between
the physician’s original decision (without the conversation) and patient preference. This
cross-flow captures the extent of poaching from the competitor’s default share via patient
persuasion rather than complementarity with detailing information. The precise structure
12The exact derivation of these expressions is provided in Appendix B
13We could assume that doctor is persuaded only a fraction of the time but assuming that would add
another parameter to the model without changing most of the insights.
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Figure 1: Patient flow in the physician’s oﬃce
and magnitude of patient flow is described in figure 1. It is pertinent to note that unlike in
the "strong preference" patient case, there is no cross-flow (poaching) in the case of “weak
preference” patients. Rather, the original detailing split is modified by the presence of
combative DTCA. The diﬀerence in flow pattern arises due to a fundamental diﬀerence in
the nature of interaction across the two patient types: in the “weak preference” case, DTCA
results in a shift in the location of the marginal patient while in the "strong preference"
case, the physician switches the product based on knowledge about the patient’s strong
preferences.
Thus, by incorporating combative DTCA and both types of patients, we can rewrite the
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sales equations of the two firms as:
DTCSales1 = (1− λ)M
∙µ
1− k2
δ2
2
¶
S + k1
δ1
2
(1− S)
¸
+λM
∙µ
1 + k1
δ1
2
¶
S − k2
δ2
2
(1− S)
¸
(6)
DTCSales2 = (1− λ)M
∙µ
1− k1
δ1
2
¶
(1− S) + k2
δ2
2
S
¸
+λM
∙µ
1 + k2
δ2
2
¶
(1− S)− k1
δ1
2
S
¸
(7)
Now that we have the complete sales function, we can incorporate this to build the overall
profit function for each firm.
3.2 Modeling Profit
We assume that the two competing firms oﬀer similar products at the same price. For
example, Viagra by Pfizer and Cialis by Lilly ICOS are prescription medicines for the same
ailment and are priced comparably. It is also common for pharmaceutical firms to decide on
promotional levels assuming a price for the product. For a given price p, the objective of the
firm then becomes one of balancing marginal revenue due to promotion and marginal cost
of promotion. Changing the price aﬀects the margin of a sale and consequently, the optimal
promotional level.14
Next, we specify the costs of promotion for each firm. Each firm incurs a variable cost of
DTCA (includes both constructive and combative elements) that increases with the levels
of DTCA δ. Further, a convex quadratic specification is assumed for δ. This implies that
14This is also the sequence of actions commonly recommended by consulting firms (Health Products
Research and ZS Associates) in the pharmaceutical market.
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the cost of DTCA increases at an increasing rate. One possible reason for this increase
can be that higher investments in DTCA are at the cost of taking money away from other
projects or borrowing more from the financial markets at a higher rate. A similar quadratic
specification is also assumed for detailing where the higher detailing level is coming at the
expense of less leisure time for the sales person and hence is costlier. Note that we have
always referred to α and δ as the detailing and DTCA levels. We will continue to use this
nomenclature, though it should be clear that the cost associated with a detailing or DTCA
level is a quadratic function. Consequently, we can derive the profit for each firm, if they
oﬀer DTCA:
π1 = p ·DTCSales1 − α
2
1
2
− δ
2
1
2
(8)
π2 = p ·DTCSales2 − α
2
2
2
− δ
2
2
2
(9)
All variables, market shares, market size and price are bounded above and below by 1 and
0 respectively15.
4 Procedure for Equilibrium Analysis
We now consider the outcome of a duopoly in which each firm decides on an advertising mix
(defined by the variables k1 and k2) consisting of constructive and combative DTCA and
then competes in the market for customers. The variables k1 and k2 can lie in the range [0, 1].
However, when these variables are in the interior of the range [0, 1] , the profit functions given
by equations (8) and (9) and corresponding first order conditions become very non-linear
15The price p used here is price normalized to product value and lies in the range [0, 1].
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functions of the key detailing and DTCA variables. Consequently, closed form solutions are
not possible for equilibrium detailing and DTCA levels. One way to resolve this issue is
to restrict the firms’ advertising mix choice to the extreme values. This implies that the
variables ki can only take on integer values 0 or 1 and hence firms oﬀer either constructive
or combative advertising only. This allows us to extract the key insights of the model using
analytical methods. The interior mix of constructive and combative DTCA can be solved
for numerically if required. Given this restriction to integer variables, there are 4 possible
outcomes for the first stage of the game: 1) Both firms oﬀer constructive DTCA: (N,N)
case, 2) Both firms oﬀer combative DTCA: (M,M) case, 3) The stronger firm (firm 1) oﬀers
combative DTCA while the weaker firm (firm 2) oﬀers constructive DTCA: (M,N) case and
finally 4) The stronger firm (firm 1) oﬀers constructive DTCA while the weaker firm (firm
2) oﬀers combative DTCA: (N,M) case. Before evaluating which one or more of these cases
occur at equilibrium, the equilibrium detailing, DTCA and profit levels for both firms for a
given advertising strategy needs to be calculated. Further, to perform comparative statics,
a benchmark case where both firms oﬀer only detailing should be evaluated. We label this
case as (D,D). Each of these cases has a unique pure strategy equilibrium in detailing and
DTCA levels. The closed form expressions in each case are provided in Appendix A.
Based on the analysis of each of these outcomes in the second stage of the overall game, we
are in a position to analyze the equilibrium strategy that firms adopt. With this objective, we
lay out the 2 by 2 matrix with the possible firm strategies and the corresponding equilibrium
profit payoﬀs.
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Firm 1 / Firm 2 Constructive Combative
Constructive π∗1(N,N), π∗2(N,N) π∗1(N,M), π∗2(N,M)
Combative π∗1(M,N), π∗2(M,N) π∗1(M,M), π∗2(M,M)
The diagonal entries are the profits to each firm under symmetric DTCA decisions. Equi-
librium conditions can be written for each of the four possibilities. As an illustration, a
symmetric equilibrium with both firms oﬀering constructive DTCA is observed when neither
firm has the incentive to unilaterally deviate from a constructive DTCA strategy. The two
conditions that are required for this are:
π∗1(N,N) ≥ π∗1(M,N) (10)
π∗2(N,N) ≥ π∗2(N,M) (11)
Similar conditions can be written for the other 3 outcomes. In order to extract key insights,
we focus on the equilibrium for two cases: first, when the firms are homogeneous in their
degree of influence in the physician’s oﬃce and second, when the firms are heterogeneous in
this influence.
5 Key Results: Homogeneous Firms
With firms homogeneous in their degree of influence in the physician’s oﬃce, we set θ = 1
and evaluate diﬀerent equilibrium possibilities. Homogeneity ensures that the set of condi-
tions that determine all possible equilibria reduce to just two in number. The symmetric
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equilibrium with both firms oﬀering constructive DTCA requires:
π∗1(N,N) or π
∗
2(N,N) ≥ π∗1(M,N) or π∗2(N,M) (12)
Similarly, the symmetric equilibrium with combative DTCA requires:
π∗1(M,M) or π
∗
2(M,M) ≥ π∗1(N,M) or π∗2(M,N) (13)
The asymmetric equilibria (M,N) or (N,M) occur when both the above conditions are
violated. Characterization of equilibrium outcomes provides straightforward insights: at any
given price p, firms are locked in a unique symmetric equilibrium with constructive DTCA
when φ is high and a unique symmetric equilibrium with combative DTCA when φ is low.
When the category is new (high φ), firms receive greater return through constructive DTCA
but when the category matures, firms do not have an incentive to invest in constructive
DTCA and would rather compete through combative DTCA. For an intermediate range of
φ, multiple equilibria may occur implying that firms would both oﬀer either constructive or
combative DTCA.
While the equilibrium outcomes are clear enough for a given p and φ, it is less clear whether
the use of DTCA relaxes or intensifies competition. This relates to the first question posed
in the introduction. At high φ, both firms prefer constructive DTCA and since this DTCA
merely adds to a common pool that benefits all competing firms, the issue of increased
competition does not arise. However, at low φ, firms prefer combative DTCA. Depending
on λ, the proportion of “weak preference” patients, this DTCA may either be in synergy
with or substitute for detailing. Further, the final impact on profit will also be moderated
by price p. Thus, evaluating whether a combative DTCA equilibrium might actually be a
21
prisoner’s dilemma for the firms is a fruitful exercise. This evaluation requires a comparison
between profits in the (N,N) and (M,M) outcomes. To see a clear analytical version of this
result, we evaluate the profits of the two firms for these outcomes at φ = 0. At this value
of φ, there is no untapped market and oﬀering constructive DTCA is of no value to either
firm. Thus, the constructive DTCA outcome (N,N) reduces to the pure detailing outcome
(D,D). The next proposition highlights equilibrium properties given that firms still have
the option to adopt combative DTCA.
Proposition 1 At φ = 0, a symmetric combative DTCA equilibrium occurs for all prices.
At this equilibrium:
Each firm makes higher profit than if combative DTCA were not oﬀered if:
0 ≤ λ < 1
2
−
¡
2−
√
3
¢
p
but is locked in a prisoner’s dilemma otherwise.
If the proportion of “weak preference” patients is low, combative DTCA and detailing act
predominantly as substitutes. Thus, when each firm makes the detailing decision, it does
so with the knowledge that a certain fraction of its customers will be poached by the com-
petition through combative DTCA. This allows the firm to lower its detailing investment.
However, it recovers lost share by adopting combative DTCA to poach from its competitor
and this strategy costs less than the money saved through detailing. Thus, the use of com-
bative DTCA helps to relax harmful detailing competition. However, this eﬀect disappears
as the fraction of “weak preference” patients increases or when price is too low. As the
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fraction of “weak preference” patients increases, the synergy between detailing and DTCA
increases. However, since this eﬀect occurs for both firms, competition in the physician’s of-
fice intensifies and profits are negatively aﬀected. To see the impact of price on this outcome:
we observe that the right hand side of the range in proposition 1 is greater than 0 only for
p > 2
¡
2−
√
3
¢
= 0.54. This implies that when the margin is low, even a poaching DTCA
strategy does not provide the necessary ROI to increase profits. This allows us to answer the
first question that we had posed: under what conditions would competing firms get locked
in a prisoner’s dilemma, when given the option of oﬀering DTCA? The answer is that for low
φ, high p and low λ, competing firms oﬀer combative DTCA at equilibrium but do not get
into a prisoner’s dilemma. For low φ, low p and high λ, a prisoner’s dilemma is observed. A
prisoner’s dilemma is never observed for high φ since both firms adopt constructive DTCA.
Now that we have the equilibrium results with DTCA, we are ready to make an assessment
of the impact of DTCA on equilibrium detailing levels. This can be done by comparing
the equilibrium detailing levels with and without DTCA for diﬀerent values of the primitive
parameters φ, p and λ.
Proposition 2 a) At high φ, both firms adopt constructive DTCA. This increases the
equilibrium detailing levels as compared to the case when no DTCA was oﬀered.
b) At low φ, both firms adopt combative DTCA. This decreases the equilibrium detailing
levels when λ < 1
2
and increases the equilibrium detailing levels when λ > 1
2
as compared to
the case when no DTCA was oﬀered. When λ = 1
2
, there is no change in detailing levels.
Suppose that two firms that have traditionally used detailing but not DTCA decide to make
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DTCA a part of the promotional mix. Should they expect their detailing to increase or
decrease as a consequence of this decision? The above proposition clarifies. We infer that
when a product is at an early stage of the product lifecycle, a firm should expect to increase its
detailing investment when it introduces DTCA since the type of DTCA used by all competing
firms would be constructive. The constructive DTCA will result in more patients walking
up to the physician. To reap the benefit of this DTCA eﬀort via increased prescriptions by
physicians for its own product, the firm will need to inform the physicians about its product.
This is achieved by increasing the detailing eﬀort. This would mean an increase in overall
promotional spend as compared to the "no DTCA" case. For a mature product category,
the firm should expect all competing firms to use combative DTCA. The eﬀect of combative
DTCA is that the patients talk to their physician about the advertised products and this
reduces the need for detailing investment only if the majority of patients are of the "strong
preference" type and consequently DTCA and detailing act as substitutes. However, if a
majority of patients are of the "weak preference" type, the use of combative DTCA bolsters
the eﬀectiveness of a firm’s own detailing. The resultant competition forces both firms to
increase detailing investment. Thus, the original intuition of marketing managers that scarce
promotional dollars can be simply shifted from detailing to DTCA gets validation only in
the case of a mature product category with a majority of "strong preference" patients. In all
other cases, the detailing requirement goes up and so does total promotional expenditure.
The results in proposition 2 enable us to answer the second question that we had posed:
how does the optimal detailing level change with the introduction of DTCA? When both
firms adopt constructive DTCA, the equilibrium detailing level increases. However, when
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both firms adopt combative DTCA, detailing level goes down when the majority of patients
are of the "strong preference" type and goes up when the majority of the patients are of the
"weak preference" type.
6 Key Results: Heterogeneous Firms
We now turn our attention to the case where firms are heterogeneous in their degree of
influence in the physician’s oﬃce. The closed form solutions for the equilibrium detailing
and DTCA levels and corresponding profit functions of each firm for the diﬀerent cases
((M,M), (N,M), (M,N), and (N,N)) are given in Appendix A. Substituting the closed
form detailing and DTCA levels into the profit functions provides analytical expressions for
profits for all cases. Equilibrium analysis reveals that general trends are analogous to the
homogeneous firms case. For large φ (early stage product category), both firms are more
likely to oﬀer constructive DTCA while for low φ (mature product category), both firms are
more likely to oﬀer combative DTCA. However, since firms are heterogeneous, the possibility
that firms adopt asymmetric strategies merits special attention. For low φ, the incentive for
either firm to adopt constructive DTCA is low since there are few untapped patients who can
be captured by use of such DTCA. For instance, at φ = 0, the symmetric combative DTCA
outcome is the only pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, an asymmetric equilibrium will never
be observed for low φ. Hence, we analytically investigate the possibility of an asymmetric
equilibrium at high φ, specifically at φ = 1. There are two possible asymmetric outcomes:
(M,N) and (N,M) and we investigate the possibility of both these equilibria at φ = 1 as
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a function of θ, the heterogeneity parameter. Further, we investigate how this relationship
between asymmetric equilibria and θ is moderated by price p and patient composition λ.
We can analytically derive the θ threshold that determines the asymmetric equilibrium for
given values of p and λ. We evaluate the asymmetric equilibrium for reasonably separated
values of p and λ. 16 The next proposition clarifies these results.
Proposition 3 Given φ = 1, a unique asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium with the stronger
firm oﬀering constructive DTCA and the weaker firm oﬀering combative DTCA may be ob-
served ((N,M) equilibrium). The specific condition required on θ for diﬀerent p and λ
combinations is:
λ = 0 λ = 1
p = 1 θ ≥ 1.16 θ ≥ 1.23
p = 1
2
θ ≥ 1.60 θ ≥ 1.77
The first observation is that a unique asymmetric equilibrium is observed when firms are
suﬃciently heterogeneous. Further, the only form this asymmetric equilibrium can take is
one where the stronger firm oﬀers constructive DTCA while the weaker firm oﬀers combative
DTCA: (N,M) equilibrium. The (M,N) equilibrium is never observed. The reason for this
is as follows: since the stronger firm has a greater degree of influence in the physician’s oﬃce,
it has strong reasons to invest in constructive DTCA at high φ and capture a large fraction
of this additional market through detailing. However, the weaker firm can counteract by
16Values for p and λ diﬀerent from those selected will lead to diﬀerent θ thresholds for the asymmetric
equilibrium.
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either poaching from the stronger firm (via the "strong preference" patients) or by increasing
own detailing eﬀectiveness through the complementary eﬀect of combative DTCA (via the
"weak preference" patients) given by equation (5). It chooses to do so when heterogeneity
is suﬃciently high. The exact heterogeneity threshold at which this occurs is moderated by
both price and proportion of patient types.
To understand the impact of the parameters p and λ, we will analyze the incentives of each
firm to unilaterally deviate from the (N,M) equilibrium. Although the stronger firm’s in-
centive to choose constructive DTCA is somewhat reduced by the competing firm’s ability
to capture some of the additional customers through combative DTCA, this attenuation is
lower than the corresponding gains at high φ. Thus, the stronger firm does not have the
incentive to unilaterally deviate. To shed light on the weaker firm’s incentive to deviate,
we analyze the revenue term which equals price×share×market size of the weaker firm in
the (N,M) and (N,N) equilibria. In the (N,M) equilibrium, the weaker firm invests in
combative DTCA that improves its own share while the stronger firm invests in constructive
DTCA that improves the market size. As price increases, the stronger firm’s ROI on con-
structive DTCA increases. Thus, given the stronger firm’s constructive advertising strategy,
the market size is increasing in price. The weaker firm’s ROI on combative DTCA is then
super-linear in price since price also aﬀects the market size in addition to margin given the
competitor’s advertising strategy. Consequently, as price increases, the weaker firm’s incen-
tive to poach from the stronger firm and free-ride on the stronger firm’s constructive DTCA
increases sharply. In the (N,N) equilibrium, both firms invest only in constructive DTCA to
increase market size. Since detailing levels are equal, the share term is simply a function of θ
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alone. Consequently, the ROI on the weaker firm’s (constructive) DTCA is a linear function
in price. This diﬀerence in ROI of the weaker firm’s DTCA as a function of price across the
(N,M) and (N,N) equilibria explains the greater likelihood of the asymmetric equilibrium
(N,M) at higher prices. This manifests itself as a lower θ threshold for the switchover point
from constructive to combative DTCA as p increases.
The λ parameter determines what fraction of combative DTCA is used to increase own
detailing eﬀectiveness versus poaching from the competition via patient persuasion. As
observed in the homogeneous firms case, increasing own detailing eﬀectiveness intensifies
competition in the physician’s oﬃce and lowers profits (the prisoner’s dilemma occurs at
higher λ). If λ is high and the weaker firm only uses combative DTCA, its detailing strength
moves closer to that of the stronger firm and detailing competition intensifies. This does
not occur when λ is low because the "strong preference" patients ensure that the weaker
firm can poach from the competition, without experiencing equivalent poaching from the
stronger firm. Thus, the weaker firm is more likely to switch to combative DTCA when λ is
low and this again manifests in terms of a lower θ threshold. While the above results clarify
scenarios when we might observe asymmetric equilibria, the heterogeneity of firms also poses
questions about DTCA levels in symmetric equilibria. The next proposition highlights these
results.
Proposition 4 a) At high φ and low enough θ 6= 1, both firms adopt constructive DTCA.
Consequently, the stronger firm oﬀers a higher level of DTCA than the weaker firm (δ∗1 > δ
∗
2)
and makes higher profits (π∗1 > π∗2).
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b) At low φ, both firms adopt combative DTCA. Consequently, the weaker firm oﬀers a higher
level of DTCA than the stronger firm if λ < 1
2
and a lower level when λ > 1
2
. The levels
are exactly equal at λ = 1
2
and are the same as if the firms are homogeneous. However, the
stronger firm always makes higher profit (π∗1 > π∗2)
The first part of the proposition discusses an early stage product category (high φ). When a
firm knows that it is more influential in the physician’s oﬃce, it can capture a greater share
of any market expansion that occurs. Hence, it has a greater incentive to invest in market
expansion. Using the same logic, the weaker firm has less incentive to invest in market
expansion. The net outcome is that the stronger firm makes a higher profit. This result
explains the policy prescription by Wosinska (2003) that firms with weaker influence in the
physician’s oﬃce should invest less in DTCA since a larger part of the category expansion
is captured by the stronger firm. Of course, this is valid only for an early stage product
category. As the product category matures, the equilibrium advertising strategy for the
firms changes from constructive to combative and this results in other outcomes.
The second part of the proposition discusses a mature product category. Suppose a firm
knows that its competitor is more influential in the physician’s oﬃce. It has two diﬀerent
ways of counteracting this eﬀect using DTCA. If the proportion of "weak preference" pa-
tients is high (high λ), it uses DTCA to increase the eﬀectiveness of its detailing through
the complementary eﬀect of combative DTCA as given in equation (5). However, since the
ROI on combative DTCA depends on detailing strength (because of the physician-patient
interaction), it can never completely overcome the stronger firm. Consequently, for high λ,
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the weaker firm invests to a lesser extent in combative DTCA as opposed to the stronger
firm. If the proportion of "weak preference" patients is low (and consequently the propor-
tion of "strong preference" patients is high), then the weaker firm has a larger pool of the
competitor’s patients that it can influence and convert to its product through combative
DTCA. Hence, its investment levels in combative DTCA are larger. Using the same logic,
the stronger firm has less incentive to invest in combative DTCA for it can convince the
physicians to prescribe its product via more productive detailing. This result could be one
of the important factors that drives the aggressive use of combative DTCA for Lunesta by
Sepracor. This addresses our third question: when would weaker firms adopt larger levels
of DTCA as compared to stronger firms? The basic answer is that if heterogeneous firms
attain an equilibrium with both firms adopting combative DTCA and the proportion of
"strong preference" patients is high, the weaker firm invests more in DTCA, although it
earns lower profits.
Results from propositions 3 and 4 convey an answer to the fourth question: when would firms
pursue constructive DTCA voluntarily? Clearly, firms are more likely to adopt constructive
DTCA during the early phase of the product lifecycle when φ is high. Even at high φ, one is
more likely to see the stronger firm pursuing constructive DTCA. The weaker firm deviates
from this strategy when the firms are suﬃciently heterogeneous in their degree of influence in
the physician’s oﬃce (high θ), product margin is high (high p) and the proportion of "strong
preference" patients is high (low λ). Further, even when the weaker firm uses constructive
DTCA, it invests less than the stronger firm. This provides some guidance to regulatory
authorities on when they might have to spend time and money to direct firms to adopt and
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perhaps increase the level of constructive DTCA.
7 Discussion
A large body of empirical literature is developing around the ROI implications of DTCA
in the pharmaceutical market. Much of this literature aims at measuring the ROI that
DTCA provides when compared to the commonly used promotional tool of detailing. Some
eﬀort has gone into addressing issues such as how these elements of the promotional mix
might interact and what specific implications these methods of promotion may have in the
physician’s oﬃce. However there is little theoretical or empirical work in this area that
formalizes how firms in a competitive environment would allocate resources across detailing
and DTCA. Our work formulates a theoretical approach towards answering this problem
with the view that the results of our theory may provide empirically testable hypotheses.
We study the impact of DTCA in a competitive environment where firms also use detail-
ing. Based on empirical and anecdotal evidence, we assume two eﬀects that DTCA might
have in pharmaceutical markets. These two eﬀects are titled constructive and combative
respectively. While constructive DTCA informs patients about the existence of a product,
combative DTCA encourages product purchase by making competing products appear less
substitutable. Of course, the physician makes the final decision on the prescription and
hence, even if a patient talks to a physician about a particular brand, it is essential that the
physician has enough information on the brand through detailing to make a decision in the
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brand’s favor. We take this factor into account in our model.
Our results reveal diﬀerent insights depending on the type of DTCA. When firms are homo-
geneous in terms of degree of influence in the physician’s oﬃce, they will tend to use both
detailing and constructive DTCA when there is a large enough untapped market. However,
when the untapped market is small the firms will adopt detailing and combative DTCA.
When the equilibrium involves combative DTCA, the firms may get locked in a prisoner’s
dilemma if the price is too low or the proportion of "weak preference" patients is too high.
Otherwise, the use of combative DTCA allows firms to relax unhealthy detailing competi-
tion. The level of detailing goes up when both firms adopt constructive DTCA. In contrast,
the level of detailing can go either up or down when both firms adopt combative DTCA. It
goes up when a majority of patients are "weak preference" resulting in positive synergies be-
tween detailing and combative DTCA. It goes down when a majority of patients are "strong
preference" resulting in detailing and DTCA substituting for each other. These insights help
in guiding managers as to when they should expect a reduction or increase in detailing eﬀort
while increasing DTCA spending.
Next, we study the case where there is heterogeneity in degree of influence in the physician’s
oﬃce. If the firms were to oﬀer only constructive DTCA, then the stronger firm ends up
spending more on DTCA because it can reap the benefits of market expansion through more
productive detailing. However, if both firms were to oﬀer combative DTCA then the weaker
firm spends more on DTCA if a majority of patients are of the "strong preference" type
while the opposite holds when a majority of patients are of the "weak preference" type.
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The weaker firm realizes that it can overcome its shortcoming in the physician’s oﬃce by
convincing the patients to ask the physicians for its product, particularly when many patients
have strong preferences. Further, for an early stage product category, symmetric equilibrium
outcomes may no longer hold when firms are suﬃciently heterogeneous. In particular, the
weaker firm deviates from a constructive advertising strategy when the firms are suﬃciently
heterogeneous, price / product margin is high and the proportion of "strong preference"
patients is high. The eﬀects of heterogeneity and the presence of "weak preference" patients
counterbalance each other. When heterogeneity is high, the weaker firm prefers to switch
to combative DTCA. However, when the number of "weak preference" patients increases,
then a switch to combative DTCA by the weaker firm increases the intensity of detailing
competition. To avoid this, the weaker firm prefers to continue with constructive DTCA.
These results inform policy makers about situations when external intervention may be
required to encourage and increase the use of constructive DTCA.
This research can be extended in many interesting directions. One promising avenue is to
study the dynamics of DTCA and detailing in a competitive setting where a branded product
competes with a generic product. Further, a study incorporating the role of "branded"
generic drugs (example, Pfizer deciding to sell the generic version of Zoloft through its
generic division, Greenstone Ltd.) would help in understanding the realignment of detailing
and DTCA to deter entry. The generic brand in such a context is analogous to a private
label brand in the consumer packaged goods industry.
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